Monthly Archives: April 2016

Supreme Mystery Surrounds Rare Order

On 6 April 2016, a three-judge panel issued a Supreme Court judgment which directed the Registrar refuse filing of further applications from an appellant.  The action appears designed to insulate a 2015 ruling by Court of Appeal Justice Rhys Harrison.

 

According to the judgment, it is the fourth ruling of the Supreme Court in the matter SC105/2015 Creser v Creser.  None identified the ground of appeal Mr Creser sought to raise.  The judgment refers specifically to a 10 March 2016 judgment not made public by the Registry.  The judgment provided no reasons for the off-record judgment nor for the ban against further filings other than to state “The Applicant’s conduct in relation to the judgment of Harrison J is an abuse of process; hence the direction in the order band.”  The alleged abusive conduct is not identified.

 

Intriguingly, the judgment failed also to identify the grounds it dismissed.  Mr Creser’s response is the judgment dismissed his application which sought the 10 March judgment be publicly recorded to comply with the Public Records Act 2005, as well as for reasons to be provided for the dismissal where none had been.  He has offered a copy of his application to demonstrate the Supreme Court considers such requests for basic transparency makes it a victim and those who ask for it ‘abusers’.

 

Similarly, Creser’s earlier application which resulted in the Supreme Court’s unpublished 10 March dismissal sought the 10 February 2016 judgment be recalled to record the Appellant’s ground of appeal against Court of Appeal Judge Rhys Harrison was “judge incapacitation”.

 

In that ruling [2015] NZCA 416, Harrison doubted Court of Appeal judges had jurisdiction to review decisions of its registrars to reject filings, doubted whether Mr Creser’s application constituted an application under the Rules and misstated Mr Creser’s appeal as an attempt to “amend” an earlier judgment when Cresr was seeking to “enforce” it.

 

Mr Creser’s application to the Supreme Court said it is not possible for a sane and rational judge to doubt a judicial jurisdiction routinely exercised at the Court of Appeal, then doubt common definitions under its own rules as to what constitutes an application and finally confuse his only ground in a three page application to the Court of Appeal.   Individually, or certainly together, these conclusions demonstrated judge incapacitation according to Creser’s original application.

 

The Supreme Court did not label the allegations and evidence scandalous.  Yet it has steadfastly refused to mention, let alone address, Creser’s single ground of appeal.  The evasion has left the legal community and public in the dark that this crucial question of a prominent judge’s basic fitness has been raised despite repeated attempts at vetting the evidence in the nation’s highest court.

 

One irony of the subterfuge is that whenever Parliament has considered proposed legislation which might make the judicial process in New Zealand more transparent and its judges accountable, the judges currently on the Supreme Court have vigorously opposed the proposed bills on grounds they are already accountable to themselves and to the public as a result of “the high visibility process” they operate in and the “rule of law requirement” that they provide reasons for their rulings.  In their 2003 response to the Judicial Matters Bill then before Parliament, New Zealand judges made a joint submission stating “(accountability is already) supported by the principle of open justice and the requirement now hardening into a rule of law, that judges give reasons for decision of any moment.  The openness of the judicial process reduces the prospect of misconduct and of it going unremarked and unchecked.”

 

Then again in 2011, in submissions to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee which claimed to have the support of every judge in New Zealand, the Acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court represented the judicial process is a high visibility process: hearings are conducted in public and judges must give reasons for their decisions, which will be subject to appeal. These features of the judicial process impose an important discipline on judges and provide an effective protection against arbitrary or biased decisions.

 

Mr Creser says he will this week file a judicial misconduct complaint with the Judicial Conduct Commissioner.  His complaint is he only asked that the judges comply with existing law they maintain an accurate record and that their attempts in response to conceal the true grounds of his appeal and secretly dismiss his application are personal abuses of office.

Why This Site is Necessary

The New Zealand Supreme Court was established by statute only in 2003. It replaced the Privy Council in England as New Zealand's highest court.
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Two years before its establishment, the New Zealand Court of Appeal was found by the Privy Council in Taito v Q [2002] UKPC 15 to have engaged in systemic abuses of due process by dismissing as many as 1,500 appeals on an ex-parte basis over the previous 10 years, sometimes on the signature of a court registrar - dismissals often given only in handwritten notations on the court file.
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The public have been told these abuses have ceased despite the Court of Appeal judges found culpable for these due process breaches being the first appointees to the new Supreme Court. Only by seeing the public court records which these judges have been hiding will we truly know.